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INTRODUCTION
A little over a decade ago, in Payne v. Tennessee, the U.S. Supreme
Court cleared the way for capital sentencing juries to consider "victim
impact evidence" (VIE).I Reversing its prior decisions in Booth v. Ma-
ryland2 and South Carolina v. Gathers,3 a six to three majority of the
Court held that "if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim
impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the
Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."'4 Part I of this Article will
discuss the Court's prior decisions in Booth and Gathers, and Parts II
and III will briefly attempt to clarify the parameters of the Payne hold-
ing. Part IV of this Article will survey the current legal landscape of
state and federal practice regarding the admissibility of VIE and argu-
ment. Finally, this Article will offer in conclusion some brief perspec-
t Visiting Professor of Law and Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project.
1 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
2 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
3 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
4 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
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tives on several unresolved issues in this particularly thorny (and
misguided) area of capital punishment jurisprudence. 5
I
THE ROAD TO PAYNE
Before attempting to establish Payne's contours, a brief discussion
of the Court's two prior decisions in this area-Booth and Gathers-is
in order.
A. Booth v. Maryland
John Booth was charged with murdering an elderly couple in Bal-
timore County, Maryland.' At the sentencing phase of Booth's trial,
the State offered a victim impact statement (VIS).: The VIS was based
on interviews with the victims' son, daughter, son-in-law, and grand-
daughter.a It contained their comments regarding the victims' per-
sonal qualities and how much they would be missed?' Other parts of
the VIS described various personal and emotional problems con-
fronted by the victims' surviving family members."'
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed Booth's convictions and
death sentence, concluding that a VIS served an important interest by
ensuring that "survivors of the murdered individuals" be given consid-
F This Article makes no attempt to exhaustively critique Payne. For a more thorough
discussion of its holding and history, see Stisan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim In-
pact Statements, 63 U. Ci-n. L. REv. 361 (1996); Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction but
Melding--The "Russian Dressing" Theory of Emotions: An Explanation oj the Phenomenology of
Emotions and Rationality with Suggested Related MaximsforJudges and Other Legal Decision Mak-
ers, 52 MrRCFR L. REv. 1033 (2001); Matthew Engle, Due Process Limitations on Victim Impact
Evidence, 13 Clxi,. D F. J. 55 (2000);John Gibeaut, The Last Word:.uJy Is Still Out on. Effects of
Victim Impact Testimony, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1997, at 42; Rachel King & Katherine Norgard, What
About Our Eanmilies? Using the Impact on Death Row Defiendants' lfamily Members as a Mitigating
Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. Riv. 1119 (1999); Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrar
, 
and
Mandatoiy Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WMi. & MARY Bn..i Ris. J. 345 (1998); Paige
McThenia, The Role of Forgiveness in Capital Murder Cases, 12 CAl'. Di. J. 325 (2000); Niru
Shanker, Getting a Grip on Payne and Restricting the Influence oJ Victim Impact Statements in
Capital Sentencing: The Timothy McVeigh Case and Various State Approaches Compared, 26 HAS-
TINGS CONsr. L.Q. 711 (1999); Joshua D. Greenberg, Comment, Is Payne Defensible?: The
Constitutionality of Admitting Victim-Inpact Evidence at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 75 IND. L.J.
1349 (2000); Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim
Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 A\i. CRIM. L. REV. 93 (1997); Ellen Kreitzberg,
How Much Payne Will the Courts Allow?, 22 C1 tAMPION,Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 31; MollyJ. Liskow,
Errors in fimy Charge Require Rpversal of a Death Sentence, N.J. Lxw., Aug. 27, 2001, at A10;
ThomasJ. Phalen & Jane L. McClellan, Speakingfor the Dead at Death Sentencing: Victim State-
ments in Capital Cases-A Right oJSurvivorship, 31 ARiz. ATT'V, Nov. 1994, at 12
( See Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-98.
7 See id. at 498-99.
8 Id. at 499.
9 See id.
In See id. at 499-500.
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eration to counterbalance "the emphasis on the perpetrator as an in-
dividual."11 The state court also held that the VIS at issue in Booth's
case contained only a "relatively straightforward and factual descrip-
tion of the effects of these murders on members of the [victims'] fam-
ily."12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 13
In a five-to-four decision, the Court rejected the State's assertion
that the VIS was a "circumstance" of the crime that the capital sen-
tencing jury should have been made aware of in assessing "the full
extent of the harm caused by Booth's actions."'14 In the majority's
view, the VIS was not relevant in the unique circumstance of a capital
sentencing hearing in which the jury's function was to "express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death."'15 The Court opined that the jury's focus should be on the
defendant's unique individual characteristics. 16 The VIS, with its em-
phasis on the character and reputation of the victim and the crime's
effect on the victim's family, disregarded the sentencing hearing's fo-
cus and introduced factors which were "wholly unrelated to the
blameworthiness of a particular defendant."' 17 This evidence, the
Court concluded, could "divert the jury's attention away from the de-
fendant's background and record, and the circumstances of the
crime."' 8
The majority was also concerned with the difficulty of providing a
capital defendant with a fair opportunity to rebut any proffered victim
impact testimony. 9  Noting that in some cases the defendant may de-
cide to place before the sentencer evidence that the victim was of "du-
bious moral character," the Court was troubled by "[t] he prospect of a
'mini-trial' on the victim's character."2 0 Such a "mini-trial," the major-
ity reasoned, could distract the sentencing jury from its "constitution-
ally required task [of] determining whether the death penalty is
appropriate in light of the background and record of the accused and
the particular circumstances of the crime."2' Because the VIS could
"serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from
deciding the case on .. .relevant evidence," the Eighth Amendment
precluded its admission. 22
I I Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098, 1103, 1124 (Md. 1986).
12 Id. at 1124.
1 9 Booth v. Maryland, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
14 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
15 See id. at 504 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 Id. at 505.
9 See id. at 506.
20 Id. at 507.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 508-09.
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Both dissenting opinions agreed with the State's argument that
the VIE was relevant because it assisted the jury in "weighing the de-
gree of harm that the defendant has caused and the corresponding
degree of punishment that should be inflicted." 23 Justice White's dis-
sent pointed out that in capital sentencing hearings, "the State has a
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the
defendant is entitled to put in." 24 His dissent also noted that the ma-
jority's fair-rebuttal argument missed the mark because Maryland had
not limited the right of defendants to rebut VIE. 25
Justice Scalia's dissent noted the rise of the victims' rights
movement:
Many citizens have found one-sided and hence unjust the criminal
trial in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the pres-
sures beyond normal human experience that drove the defendant
to commit his crime, with no one to lay before the sentencing au-
thority the full reality of human suffering the defendant has pro-
duced-which (and not moral guilt alone) is one of the reasons
society deems his act worthy of the prescribed penalty. 2"
Justice Scalia concluded that precluding VIE and argument was "in
effect to prescribe a debate on the appropriateness of the capital pen-
alty with one side muted."2 7
B. South Carolina v. Gathers
The Court was next confronted with VIE and arguments in Gath-
ers.28 During the guilt-or-innocence phase of the proceedings, the
court admitted several items found near the scene of the offense, al-
legedly removed from the victim's wallet and bags, as evidence. 2 1
Gathers was convicted of murder." The prosecutor's penalty phase
summation focused on two of these items, a voter registration card
and a religious tract called the "Game Guy's Prayer."3' After reading
the prayer to the jury, the prosecutor made the following comments:
Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He took part. And
he believed that in Charleston County, in the United States of
America, that in this country you could go to a public park and sit
23 See id. at 515 (White,J., dissenting); id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 517 (White, J., dissesnting).
25 See id. at 518 (White, J., dissenting).
26 Jd. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 490 U.S. 805 (1989). The author submitted an amicus curiae brief in Gathers on
behalf of the South Carolina Public Defenders' Association.
29 See id. at 807.
30 See id. at 807-08.
3 1 See id. at 808-09.
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on a public bench and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius
Gathers. 32
Gathers was sentenced to death. 3  On direct appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new sentencing trial because the
prosecutor's remarks "conveyed the suggestion [that Gathers] de-
served a death sentence because the victim was a religious man and a
registered voter. '" 34 The Court granted certiorari. 35
In upholding the decision, another five-to-four majority of the
Court acknowledged that Booth left open the possibility that victim im-
pact information might be admissible if it related directly to the cir-
cumstances of the offense. 36 However, the Court rejected the State's
argument that the prosecutor's comments fell within the legal gray
area. Although the victim's personal papers themselves were admissi-
ble as a relevant circumstance of the crime, and thus a proper subject
for comment, the Court concluded that "the prosecutor's argument
in this case went well beyond that fact. ' 37 The majority reasoned that
there was no evidence the defendant read the victim's papers or knew
their contents because the eyewitness testimony indicated that he ri-
fled through the victim's bags very quickly and that the crime hap-
pened at night in a poorly-lit area.38 Thus, "the content of the various
papers ... was purely fortuitous" and provided no "information rele-
vant to the defendant's moral culpability."319 Unless the Court were
prepared to overrule Booth, Justice White concluded in his concur-
rence, the judgment below should be affirmed. 40
Justice O'Connor authored one of the dissenting opinions, in
which she was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ken-
nedy. 4' In her view, even if Booth were still good law, 42 it "should not
be read . . .to preclude prosecutorial comment which gives the sen-
tencer a 'glimpse of the life' a defendant 'chose to extinguish.'- 43 She
argued that nothing in the Eighth Amendment prevents a prosecutor
from "conveying to the jury a sense of the unique human being whose
life the defendant has taken. '44 Such evidence, in her view, was rele-
32 Id. at 810 (citation omitted).
3-3 Id. at 806.
34 See State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144-45 (S.C. 1988).
35 South Carolina v. Gathers, 488 U.S. 888 (1988).
36 See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 811-12.
39 Id. at 812.
40 Id. (White, J., concurring).
41 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was prepared to over-
rule Booth, but she did not think it was necessary to do so to decide the case at bar. Id.
43 Id. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
44 Id. at 817 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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vant to the sentencer's moral judgment in determining the appropri-
ate penalty.4 5 Justice O'Connor also noted an imbalance in the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence arising from the fact that
the defendant was permitted to present a wide array of evidence in
mitigation. 4" She would have remanded the case to the state court to
consider whether the prosecutor's comments manipulated the evi-
dence and deprived the defendant of the right to rebut the evi-
dence.47 "Because[, in her view,] the majority instead adopts an
Eighth Amendment barrier to virtually any discussion of the victim's
personal characteristics at the penalty phase of a murder trial,"Justice
O'Connor dissented.4 8
Justice Scalia filed a separate dissenting opinion, asserting again
that Booth was wrongly decided. 41 He stated that it would be "a viola-
tion of [his] oath to adhere to what [he] consider[s] a plainly unjusti-
fied intrusion upon the democratic process in order that the Court
might save face. 511 In Justice Scalia's opinion:
Booth [had no] arguable basis in the common-law background that
led up to the Eighth Amendment, in any longstanding societal tra-
dition, or in any evidence that present society, through its laws or
the actions of its juries, has set its face against considering the harm
caused by criminal acts in assessing responsibility. 5 1
II
PAYNE
Pervis Tyrone Payne was charged with the murders of Charisse
Christopher and her two-year-old daughter, Lacie, as well as with the
attempted murder of Charisse's three-year-old son, Nicholas. 52 Payne
was convicted on all counts. 53 At the sentencing phase of the trial, the
State presented the testimony of Charisse's mother, who testified
about the effects of the murders. She described how Nicholas cried
for his mother and his sister and how much he missed them. 54 The
prosecution maintained that although there was nothing that could
be done for Charisse's parents, there was something thejury could do
for Nicholas. 55 He would "want to know what type of justice was
41, See id. at 818 (O'Connor,.]., dissenting).
46 See id. at 817 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4 7 See id. at 814, 822 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48 hM. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49 See id. (Scalia, I. dissenting).
50 i. at 825 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 ht. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52 Payne v. Teniessce, 501 U.S. 808, 811 (1991).
53 /i.
54 Id. at 814.
55 Id. at 815 (citation omitted).
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done .... With your verdict," the prosecutor asserted, "you will pro-
vide the answer."15" The prosecutor also argued that:
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the
chance to grow up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two
years old .... And there won't be anybody there-there won't be
her mother there or Nicholas' [sic] mother there to kiss him at
night. His mother will never kiss him good night or pat him as he
goes off to bed, or hold him and sing him a lullaby .... [Defense
counsel] wants you to think about a good reputation, people who
love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you to
think about the people who love Charisse Christopher, her mother
and daddy who loved her. The people who loved little LacieJo, the
grandparents who are still here. The brother who mourns for her
every single day and wants to know where his best little playmate
is.5 7
Payne was sentenced to death. 58 The Supreme Court of Tennes-
see affirmed, 5"' and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to recon-
sider its prior decisions in Booth and Gathers.6t 1
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the
"two premises" of Booth and Gathers: (1) that "evidence relating to a
particular victim or to the harm that a capital defendant causes a vic-
tim's family [does] not in general reflect on the defendant's 'blame-
worthiness' "; and (2) that "only evidence relating to [the defendant's]
'blameworthiness' is relevant to the capital sentencing decision."',
The Chief Justice believed these premises were faulty, however, be-
cause "the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of
the crime charged has understandably been an important concern of
the criminal law." 62 Thus, he recognized that two equally blamewor-
thy defendants may be punished differently solely on the basis of the
harm caused."" He also noted that in recent years, in cases in which
judges had exercised their sentencing discretion, "the consideration
of the harm caused by the crime has been an important factor in the
exercise of that discretion. '" 4
The Chief Justice argued that Booth and Gathers should be over-
ruled to right the imbalance created by the Court's lenient treatment
of defense mitigation-evidence. 65 Precluding VIE "unfairly weighted
56 1d. (citation omitted).
57 Id. at 816 (citation omitted).
58 [d.
59 State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tenn. 1990).
60 See Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1080 (1991).
61 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991).
62 Id.
64 Id. at 820.
65 See id. at 822, 830.
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the scales in a capital trial. '66 Although few, if any, limits are placed
on the admission of mitigating evidence regarding the defendant and
his circumstances, the State is barred both from offering a "'quick
glimpse of the life"' the defendant took and from "demonstrating the
loss to the victim's family and to society which has resulted from the
defendant's homicide. 6
7
The majority dispensed with the arguments that the Booth Court
found persuasive. Addressing the difficulties in rebutting VIE while
avoiding a "mini-trial" about the victim's character, the majority ar-
gued that "the mere fact that for tactical reasons it might not be pru-
dent for the defense to rebut victim impact evidence makes the case
no different than others in which a party is faced with this sort of a
dilemma." 68 The Court also brushed aside the argument that VIE
"permits a jury to find that defendants whose victims were assets to
their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose
victims are perceived to be less worthy."'6 9 VIE, the Chief Justice
opined, is not generally "offered to encourage comparative judgments
of this kind," but is offered instead to show each victim's 'uniqueness
as an individual human being.' "70
Ultimately, the majority believed that "[v] ictim impact evidence is
simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority
about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a
general type long considered by sentencing authorities."7' The new
majority concluded:
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for
the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability
and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing
phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.
We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of
victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject,
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. A State may legiti-
mately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the im-
pact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's
decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be
imposed.7 2
66 Id. at 822.
67 Id. (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
68 Id. at 823.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 825.
72 Id. at 825, 827.
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The Court noted that "[i]n the event that evidence is introduced
that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally
unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides a mechanism for relief. '73 Furthermore, the Court made clear
that its decision did not affect Booth's holding "that the admission of a
victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the
crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment."74
Justice O'Connor's concurrence largely echoed the majority
opinion, stating that "there is no strong societal consensus that a jury
may not take into account the loss suffered by a victim's family or that
a murder victim must remain a faceless stranger."7 5 Thus, a "State
may decide . . . that the jury should see a 'quick glimpse of the life
petitioner chose to extinguish.' -76 She also recognized that in some
cases, a witness's testimony or a prosecutor's arguments may render
the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 77 Finally, Justice O'Connor stated that Payne did not af-
fect other VIE which Booth barred, such as "opinions of the victim's
family about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate
sentence."
78
Justice Souter also authored a concurring opinion, joined by jus-
tice Kennedy, in which he argued that some VIE is relevant because
murder has "foreseeable consequences. ' 79 Murder victims are distinct
individuals, and there are always victims "left behind. ''8 "[The] fore-
seeability of the killing's consequences imbues them with direct moral
relevance .... -" He also opined that Booth created an unworkable
rule that threatened to produce arbitrary results because some evi-
dence about the victim will, in many cases, be admitted at the guilt-or-
innocence phase of the proceedings. 82 Because the jury could not be
deprived of "such common contextual evidence" without distorting
"the comprehensibility of most trials," Booth's objective could not be
maintained unless separate sentencing juries were impaneled. 83 Jus-
tice Souter cautioned, however, that "[e]vidence about the victim and
73 1(d. at 825 (citation omitted).
74 Id. at 830 n.2.
75 Id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76 ld. at 830 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
77 See id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 833 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion focused
primarily on stare decisis, a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
79 Id. at 838-39 (Souter, J., concurring).
80 See id. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring).
81 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
82 See id. at 839-40 (Souter, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 841 (Souter, J., concurring).
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survivors, and any jury argument predicated on it, can of course be so
inflammatory as to risk a verdict impermissibly based on passion, not
deliberation."' 4 He also recognized that the Court's decision did not
upset Booth's holding "that a sentencing authority should not receive a
third category of information concerning a victim's family members'
characterization of and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and
the appropriate sentence. '85
Justice Marshall's dissent focused primarily on the fact that there
was no justification for abandoning Booth because nothing had
changed except for the Court'sjustices.86 The arguments accepted by
the Payne majority were precisely those rejected in Booth.87 Justice
Marshall observed: "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this
Court's decisionmaking."88
Justice Stevens's dissent noted that even if Booth had never been
decided, the Court's Eighth Amendment decisions did not support
"the majority's conclusion that the [State] may introduce evidence
that sheds no light on the defendant's guilt or moral culpability, and
thus serves no purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in
favor of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather
than their reason."8 t
III
THE LIMITS OF PAYNE
Payne lifted the per se ban on the admissibility of VIE, but what
does it permit? Are there any substantive restrictions on the types and
modes of VIE that the prosecution may present? For example, who
may testify about what? What other evidence may the sentencer hear?
Are there any procedural safeguards necessary to safeguard a capital
defendant's right to a reliable sentencing determination? Payne pro-
vides no answers to these and other questions, and the Court has not
seen fit to grant certiorari in any post-Payne case raising a VIE ques-
tion. Furthermore, Paynes dual reasons for permitting VIE-to offset
the defendant's mitigating evidence and to permit the jury to assess
the specific harm resulting from the offense9g1-are so vague that it is
extraordinarily difficult to determine Payne's scope.
On the one hand, the Payne majority indicated that there would
be no constitutional problem if a State were to permit the prosecution
84 Id. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 835 n.I (Souter, J., concurring).
86 See id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 846-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at. 844 (Marshall, ]., dissenting).
89 Id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 See id. at 825.
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to present a capital sentencing jury with "'a quick glimpse of the life"'
the defendant took.9 1 Thus, one could reasonably argue that Payne
sanctions only a very limited victim impact presentation in order to
prevent the victim from being "faceless." On the other hand, the en-
forcement mechanism that the Court chose-whether the evidence is
"so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally un-
fair"9 2-is so permissive that much more may be tolerable. Thus, the
question of how much and what kind of VIE is permissible remains
unanswered. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, however, most
state and federal courts allow extensive VIE, greatly exceeding the
"quick glimpse" standard of admission.93
Furthermore, Payne did not address what procedural protec-
tions-including notice, pre-admission in in camera hearings, and lim-
iting instructions-are necessary to safeguard a capital defendant's
right to a reliable determination of the appropriate penalty. It is
clear, however, from the majority and concurring opinions that Payne
left intact the Booth Court's holding that a victim's family members
may not express their opinions about the crime, the defendant or the
appropriate sentence. 9 4 However, as discussed below, some states
even permit this type of VIE.95
IV
PAYNE'S APPLICATION IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Payne, of course, does not require states to allow VIE; the Court
held only that the "Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."' 6 Not
surprisingly, due to the increasing power of the victims' rights move-
ment,9 7 almost all jurisdictions with the death penalty have neverthe-
less taken advantage of the Supreme Court's relaxation of the
constitutional ban and now authorize VIE and argument."- In fact,
thirty-three of the thirty-eight states with the death penalty, as well as
the federal government and the military, currently allow the use of
VIE in capital trials?' ' Most jurisdictions have done so with little or no
reasoned analysis as to why this type of evidence and argument should
91 See id. at 822, 827 (quoting Mills v. Maiyland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting); supra note 67 and accompanying text.
92 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
93 See infra Part IV.
94 See sulpra notes 74, 78, 85 and accompanying text.
95 See ;nfra Part IV.A.I.
96 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (emphasis omitted).
97 See Andrea F. Siegel, Civil Suits Become Forum for Payback, BALT. SUN, Mar. 1, 2001, at
D1.
98 See infra Table 1.
99 Five states have not yet decided whether VIE is admissible. See infra Table 1.
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be admissible, other than referring to the Payne decision. 100 Further-
more, as will be discussed below, surprisingly few jurisdictions provide
any substantive limits or procedural protections regulating the admis-
sion of VIE and argument. The overwhelming trend is toward the
unfettered admission of a wide array of VIE and arguments.
A. State Courts
1. Substantive Considerations
As reflected in Table 1, thirty-three states allow VIE; however,
only two states do so under somewhat limited circumstances, and five
states have yet to rule on the admissibility of VIE.
TABLE 1 wl
Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence by State
Limited
Undecided Admissibility Admissible
Connecticut Indiana Alabama Nevada
Montana Mississippi Arizona New Jersey
New Hampshire Arkansas New Mexico
New York California North Carolina
Wyoming Colorado Ohio
Delaware Oklahoma
Florida Oregon
Georgia Pennsylvania
Idaho South Carolina
Illinois South Dakota
Kansas Tennessee
Kentucky Texas
Louisiana Utah
Maryland Virginia
Missouri Washington
Nebraska
Indiana and Mississippi are the only two states that appear to sig-
nificantly restrict the admission of VIE. Although neither jurisdiction
finds VIE per se inadmissible, both states claim to utilize a higher stan-
dard of relevance. Indiana, for example, prohibits VIE unless it is rel-
evant to one of the statutory aggravating factors 1 2 The Indiana
Supreme Court has never upheld a trial court's admission of VIE.
I00 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 410 S.E.2d 547, 555 (S.C. 1991) (citing Payne as authority
and holding that it was not reversible error for the prosecutor to tell the sentencing jury
that the victim's "family could not go see him, they could only visit him at the grave").
lot This Table and the following discussion are based on the author's research.
102 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b) (Michie 1998) (establishing the statutory aggra-
vating circumstances); Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind. 1994).
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However, when confronted with a case in which VIE was erroneously
admitted, the court has often found the error harmless. 0
Mississippi requires that VIE be "proper and necessary to a devel-
opment of the case" and further requires the prosecution to demon-
strate that the evidence "could not serve in any way to incite the
jury." 10 4 Mississippi was one of the few states that initially hesitated to
adopt Payne's holding, stating that "Payne ... is properly phrased in
terms of the constitutionally permissible, not the mandatory, and in
prudence, we should await another day to explore the full reach of
our rediscovered freedom."'1 5 However, the state court later held
that a prosecutor's statement that "injustice would be hard to bear by
the family and friends of the victim" had some probative value and
then opined that, taking the trial as a whole, the comments were not
overly prejudicial. 106 Thus, although Mississippi technically considers
VIE inadmissible, 117 it does not bar all VIE or argument, and trial
courts appear to have discretion to determine whether, under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the prosecution may introduce VIE.
2. What Evidence States Permit
Payne expressly sanctioned evidence related to the victim's per-
sonal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the
victim's family. 108 That is precious little guidance, and a review of
many cases reveals that states permit a wide array of VIE. Not surpris-
ingly, evidence about the victim's good character is common. 1° 9 In
other cases, evidence has been presented about the victim's talents,' '(
intelligence,"' spirituality, 1 2 work ethic and educational back-
103 See, e.g., Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1196 (Ind. 2001); Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at
957.
104 Jenkins v. State, 607 So. 2d 1171, 1183 (Miss. 1992); see also Edwards v. State, 737
So. 2d 275, 291 (Miss. 1999) (finding no error in admission of VIE because it was probative
and not prejudicial).
105 Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 146-47 (Miss. 1991).
1o6 See Edwards, 737 So. 2d at 291.
107 See Hansen, 592 So. 2d at 146-47.
1o8 See Payne'v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
109 See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 940, 942 (Del. 1994) (allowing evidence
that victim was a "humble ... gracious man"); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo.
1994) (holding that it was not error to allow evidence that victim did not have a "'hateful
bone in her body'").
1 10 See Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 250-51 (Md. 1995) (finding relevant the evi-
dence that victim was a highly-skilled piano player).
III See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 431-32 (La. 1998) (holding that evidence of
victim's intelligence is admissible).
112 See Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839, 842, 844 (Ga. 1997) (holding that testimony
that victim had a "'new found faith and spirituality"' was neither prejudicial nor inadmissi-
ble); Lucas v. Evatt, 416 S.E.2d 646, 648 (S.C. 1992) (holding that testimony that victims
were "good honest hardworking God fearing people" did not render the trial "'fundamen-
tally unfair"').
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ground,' - ' standing .in the community,' '4 and numerous other
traits.' '5 In addition, most states allowing VIE place no limits on the
number of VIE witnesses that may testify.' 'I
Courts have also allowed wide-ranging evidence about the effects
of the murder on the victim's family, with few restrictions. In one
case, for example, the victim's sister was permitted to testify that her
marriage ended as a result of the murder.' '7 In other cases, relatives
have been permitted to testify about miscarriages,' i8 heart attacks,' 19
and other illnesses and negative effects.1 211
Despite Payne's supposed requirement that VIE should be related
to the "emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family," 121 most
states permit the admission of much broader sentiments. Some states
limit VIE to family members,'2 2 but most do not. Co-workers, friends,
III See Smith v. State, 756 So. 2d 892, 917-18 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (upholding ad-
mission of witness testimony "about the victim's work ethic and college background" in the
guilt phase of a capital trial).
I4 ,See State v. Simpson, 479 S.E.2d 57, 60 (S.C. 1996) (upholding admission of testi-
mony that related to the victim's "standing in the community").
115 In some cases, counsel for the capital defendant have attempted to present evi-
dence of the victim's bad character or traits. If the victim's personal characteristics are
relevant at sentencing, then they should be fair game for either side. However, courts have
typically excluded this information, even though Payne provides no clear basis for this re-
suit. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 496 S.E.2d 674, 689 (Ga. 1998) (holding that evidence of
victim's bad character is inadmissible); State v. Southerland, 447 S.E.2d 862, 867 (S.C.
1994) (holding that the defendant is prohibited from presei.ting evidence regarding vic-
tim's involvement with drugs and prostitution), overruled on other grounds by State v. Chap-
man, 463 S.E.2d 314 (S.C. 1995). But see Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 922-23 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1997) (holding that refisal to permit defense counsel to cross-examine victim
impact witness and refusal to admit rebuttal evidence about victim's drug use was reversible
error).
l See, e.g., Pickren v. State, 500 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga. 1998) (upholding admission of
eight VIS and refusing to place "rigid limitations on the volume" of VIS). New Jersey is the
sole exception; the general rule there is that absent special circumstances, only one witness
may testify. See State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996). Despite an express
statutory provision, Illinois courts have refused to place any limits on the number of wit-
nesses. See People v. Gonzales, 673 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
117 See McDuff v. State, 939 SY.'.2d 607, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (expressing hesi-
tancy but ultimately upholding admissibility).
118 See, e.g., Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 848-49 (hnd. 1996) (holding that testi-
mony that attempted murder victim had a miscarriage was admissible).
119 See, e.g., Young v. State, 992 P.2d 332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that testi-
mony that victim's aunt suffered fatal heart attack when she received the news of her
nephew's death was not erroneously admitted).
120 See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that
testimony that victim's father gave Up his bout with cancer after his daughter's mtrder was
admissible).
121 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991).
122 New jersey, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, and Virginia, for example, place limitations
on who may give victim impact testimony. See State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 175 (N.J.
1996) (characterizing VIE as a "brief statement from the victim's family"); IDAhO CoDE
§ 19-5306(3) (Michie 2002) (allowing the families of homicide victims to testify at sentenc-
ing hearings); People v. Hope, 702 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ill. 1998) (limiting the meaning of
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distant family members, and neighbors have been allowed to testify
regarding the impact of the victim's death on them, the victim's fam-
ily, or the community. 23 For example, in Oklahoma, VIE comprises
the following:
[I]nformation about the financial, emotional, psychological, and
physical effects of a violent crime on each victim and members of
their immediate family, or person designated by the victim or by
family members of the victim and includes information about the
victim, circumstances surrounding the crime, the manner in which
the crime was perpetrated, and the victim's opinion of a recom-
mended sentence.1 24
Arguably, permitting testimony from the victim's relatives and as-
sociates is less disturbing than allowing evidence about the effect of
the murder on the larger community. 2 5 For example, courts have
admitted evidence to show the impact of a law enforcement officer's
death on the "law enforcement community. ' ' 12 6
In addition to testimony from witnesses, courts have allowed the
prosecution to present poems, 127 videotapes, 28 pre-death photo-
"crime victim" as used in the Illinois Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act to a spouse,
child, parent, or sibling of the victim in the case on trial); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 7 8 0(a)
(2002) (stating that "[i]n every case resulting in serious physical injury or death, the victim
or a member of the victim's immediate family ... may, at the request of the State's Attor-
ney and in the discretion of the sentencing judge, address the sentencing judge or jury
under oath or affirmation before the imposition of sentence"); V,\. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
11.01 (B) (Michie 2000) (defining "victim" in a capital case as the spouse, parent, child,
sibling, or legal guardian of the deceased). However, the states have not always strictly
enforced the statutory limitations. See People v. Hall, 743 N.E.2d 126, 137 (Ill. 2000) (find-
ing that because the testimony was brief and the aggravating evidence was significant, al-
lowing VIE from the victim of another crime was harmless); Beck v. Commonwealth, 484
S.E.2d 898, 905-06 (Va. 1997) (noting that the Virginia statute limits neither the Common-
wealth's sources of VIE, nor the court's discretion in determining admissibility of
evidence).
123 See Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that dis-
tant "family members, close friends, or co-workers may, in a given case, provide legitimate
testimony"); see also Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ark. 1997) (allowing VIE that
demonstrated how the "victim's death represent[ed] a unique loss to society and ... to his
family"); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793, 804 (Nev. 1996) (allowing the testimony of the
victim's neighbor); State v. Byram, 485 S.E.2d 360, 365-66 (S.C. 1997) (allowing testimony
of the victim's co-worker).
124 OKLLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984(1) (West 2001); see also Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806,
827 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (discussing the statute's meaning in light of Payne).
125 See Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 939-40 (Del. 1994); McClain v. State, 477 S.E.2d
814, 824-25 (Ga. 1996).
126 See, e.g., Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 213-16 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). But see
Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1060, 1062-65 (Ind. 1996) (finding error in admission of
evidence that since the murder of a police officer, the chief of police could no longer do
his job properly and other officers had sought psychological counseling).
127 See, e.g., Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 446-47 (Ark. 1998); State v. Basile, 942
S.W.2d 342, 358-59 (Mo. 1997).
128 See, e.g., Hicks, 940 S.W.2d at 857 (allowing a fourteen-minute videotape narrated by
victim's brother as VIE); Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 251 (Md. 1995) (allowing a
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:257
graphs,129 and handcrafted items made by the victim.' 30 In one case,
the State was allowed to show the jury a photograph of a dead fetus
dressed in clothes that the child's mother, who was also killed, had
intended for him to wear home from the hospital. 13' The state court
found the photograph relevant in that it showed the "individuality of
the unborn child."'132
VIE from victims of the defendant's prior crimes is generally
deemed inadmissible on the basis that it is irrelevant to the case for
which the defendant is standing trial. As the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals explained, VIE should only relate to the impact of the under-
lying offense, not to other offenses. 133 Colorado, Illinois, and Nevada
also have expressly rejected the admission of VIE from victims not
named in the indictment. 3 4 On the other hand, some states have
allowed victims of other crimes to testify. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court, for example, upheld the admission of VIE from the
daughter of a woman whom the defendant murdered many years
before. 1_5
Finally, despite Payne's holding to the contrary, some states per-
mit opinion testimony about the defendant and whether the defen-
dant should be sentenced to death. Oklahoma, Alabama, and Kansas
expressly allow victim impact testimony containing the victim impact
witness's opinion as to the appropriate sentence for the capital defen-
videotape as VIE); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) (allowing a videotape of
family Christmas-gathering as VIE); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 749-51 (N.M. 1999) (al-
lowing a three-minute videotape of the victim, where other VIE was minimal, and where a
photograph from the same trip had already been introduced at trial).
129 New Jersey, for example, allows pre-homicide photographs, but gives the court dis-
cretion to prescribe the size, location and duration of their exhibition. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3c(6) (West 2002). In Oregon, photographs are admissible "to show the general
appearance .. .of the victim while alive" and may be accompanied by additional VIE for
the purpose of identifying the victim. State v. Hayward, 963 P.2d 667, 676 & n.4, 677 (Or.
1998). California also allows photographs of the victims in order to aid the jury in deter-
mining "the size, age and vulnerability of the victims." People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436,
465 (Cal. 1991). Missouri, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas also allow pre-homicide pho-
tographs. See State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908,927 (Mo. 1994); State v. Hill, 595 N.E.2d 884,
895-96 (Ohio 1992); State v. Tucker, 478 S.E.2d 260, 266-67 (S.C. 1996); Solomon v.
State, 49 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Oklahoma, however, does not. See Cargle,
909 P.2d at 830.
130) See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 604 (Mo. 1997).
'3' See State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328, 331-32 (S.C. 1998).
1-2 Id. at 332.
133 See Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 713-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cantu v. State,
939 S.W.2d 627, 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
134 See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 744-45 & n.14 (Colo. 1999); People v. Hope,
702 N.E.2d 1282, 1287-89 (11. 1998); Sherman v. State, 965 P.2d 903, 914 (Nev. 1998)
(holding that VIE from a previous crime is neither relevant nor admissible by statute).
Additionally, Ohio does not allow VIE from noncapital victims in capital cases, because the
Ohio legislature has yet to create a provision allowing such testimony. See State v. White,
709 N.E.2d 140, 152-53 (Ohio 1999).
115 See State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 204-05 (N.C. 1994).
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dant. 136  However, most jurisdictions deem such evidence
inadmissible. 37
In addition, most jurisdictions have a fairly strict policy of only
permitting VIE at the sentencing phase of the proceedings. 3 , How-
ever, a few states have permitted VIE at the innocence-or-guilt phase
if the evidence is relevant to the circumstances of the murder, the
existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances that permit the
death penalty, and the nature and circumstances of the statutory
aggravating circumstances, if the evidence is introduced to attempt
to refute or rebut mitigating evidence offered, or if the defendant
requests a presentence investigation report.13 9
Similarly, VIE may enter the first phase of a capital trial as part of a
witness's identification of a photograph of the victim. 140 Four states
136 See Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that
victim impact witness may give his opinion as to the correct punishment for the defendant,
but, if he does, the court will review the case with heightened scrutiny on appeal). Ala-
bama and Kansas allow opinions as to the appropriate sentence during a sentencing hear-
ing, unless the defendant can show that the judge improperly relied on such statements in
determining the sentence. See Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 213-14 (Ala. Crim. App.
1998); State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850, 863-64 (Kan. 1995).
137 See, e.g., Ex parte Reiber, 663 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala. 1995) (holding that a
presentence report containing the opinion of the victim's husband on the appropriate
sentence for the defendant was harmless error); State v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1089-90
(Idaho 1991) (finding opinion as to the proper sentence inadmissible, but harmless be-
cause sentencing judge did not consider it); State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 970-73 (La.
1992) (finding survivors' opinions about the crime and appropriate punishment irrelevant
and as such inadmissible); State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 378 (Mo.. 1997) (holding that
opinion of four of the victims' family members that defendant should receive the death
penalty was inadmissible, but that the error was harmless); State v. Joubert, 455 N.W.2d
117, 129-30 (Neb. 1990) (finding victim's family members' characterizations about the
defendant or their opinions as to the appropriate sentence inadmissible, but harmless be-
cause the sentencing judge is entitled to a presumption that he did not rely upon errone-
ously admitted evidence); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 176-77 (N.J. 1996) (holding
that admission of survivor's opinions on the correct punishment, the defendant and the
crime violates the Eighth Amendment); State v. Treesh, 739 N.E.2d 749, 776-78 (Ohio
2001) (finding error in allowing the court to hear opinion as to the appropriate sentence,
but not reversible error because there was no evidence that the judge relied on the infor-
mation in affirming the jury's recommended sentence).
138 See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(7) (giving the murder victim "the right to
make a statement to the court at sentencing and at any post-sentencing hearings for the
accused"); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (giving victims the right to make a statement at sen-
tencing); Ex parte Reiber, 663 So. 2d at 1005; People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 466 (Cal.
1991); Card, 825 P.2d at 1088 (Idaho 1999); People v. Howard, 588 N.E.2d 1044, 1067-68
(111. 1991); State v. Southerland, 447 S.E.2d 862, 867 (S.C. 1994) (holding that an opening
statement may not be made at the guilt phase of the trial), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Chapman, 454 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1995); Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d.522, 534 (Wyo. 1993)
(holding that VIE is not allowed during the guilt phase of the trial because it is "absolutely
irrelevant with respect to the issues before the jury" (emphasis omitted)).
139 White, 709 N.E.2d at 154; see also State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ohio
1995) (holding that evidence which depicts both the circumstances and impact of the mur-
der on the victim's family is admissible at both the guilt and sentencing phases).
140 See, e.g., State v. Hayward, 963 P.2d 667, 677 (Or. 1998).
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expressly require the prosecution to establish the existence of at least
one statutory aggravating factor before VIE may be admitted: Florida,
Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.14
a. Procedural Protections-Notice (or Lack Thereof
Surprisingly, there is no uniform requirement that the defendant
even be informed prior to trial that the prosecution intends to present
VIE. A few states-Georgia, Louisiana, and New Jersey-require par-
ticularized notice of what evidence the prosecution intends to intro-
duce. 142 Similarly, Tennessee requires the prosecution to notify the
defendant that it intends to present VIE so that a hearing may be re-
quested to determine the admissibility of the particular evidence. 143
Other states, notably Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Penn-
sylvania, express a preference for notice, but do not require it. In
State v. Cargle, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the State
should give detailed notice to the defendant of the VIE it intends to
introduce. 44 The court also held that VIE should be limited to that
for which the State gave notice to the defendant before trial. 145 Simi-
larly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the State should give
notice to the defendant of its intention to introduce VIE.'141 Courts in
Kentucky and Nebraska, although stopping short of recommending
or requiring notice, hold that pretrial notice is an adequate procedu-
ral safeguard of a defendant's due process rights. 147 The remaining
states have no apparent notice requirement.
141 See Fi,'. S-rxAr. ANN. § 921.141(7) (West 2000) (allowing VIE once the prosecutor
has provided evidence of at least one of the statutory aggravating tactors); 42 P,\. CONS.
STAT. § 9711 (a)(2) (2002) (aloVing the jUy to consider VIE if it finds at least one statu-
toly aggravating factor); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828 (Okla. Crin. App. 1995) (find-
ing that VIE should not be introduced Unless evidence of at least one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances is evident in the record); State v. Reid, No. M1999-00803-CCA-
R3-DD, 2001 WL 584283, at *38 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2001) (holding that evidence
may not be admitted until the court deterines that evidence of one or more of the aggra-
vating factors exists in the record).
142 SeeTurner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839, 841-42 (Ga. 1997) (holding that defense must
receive a copy of the pre-written victim impact statement prior to the witness testifying so
the defense may object to aspects of the prepared statement that it finds problematic);
Bernard, 608 So. 2d at 972-73 (requiring notice of the particulars of the VIE the prosecu-
tion intends to introduce); Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 180 (holding that if the state intends to
introduce VIE, the defendant should be notified prior to the sentencing phase and the
state must give the names of the witnesses it plans to call).
143 See State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998).
144 See 909 P.2d at 828.
145 See id.
146 Commonwealth v. Natividad, 773 A.2d 167, 177-78 (Pa. 2001).
147 See Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997); State v. Blorklund, 604
N.W.2d 169, 215 (Neh. 2000).
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b. Pre-Admisszbility Hearings
Five states expressly allow or require a hearing outside the pres-
ence of thejury to determine the admissibility of VIE that the prosecu-
tion intends to introduce at the sentencing phase: Georgia, Louisiana,
New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.1 4 8 In the remaining states, no
such hearing is required. A few states require the prosecution to sub-
mit proposed VIE in writing before it is actually admitted at trial.'
4 
'
In New Jersey, the statement should be limited to "a general factual
profile of the victim, including information about the victim's family,
employment, education, and interests," and "can describe generally
the impact of the victim's death on his or her immediate family."'
5 1
'
c. Jury Instructions
A handful of states, including New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Penn-
sylvania, require trial judges to provide the jury with limiting instruc-
tions regarding the use of VIE. 15 ' The New Jersey instruction
admonishes the jury that it is not to balance the life of the defendant
against the life of the victim, but may consider VIE only when weigh-
ing the catch-all mitigating circumstance. 152 In Oklahoma, the jury is
instructed that VIE is not proof of an aggravating circumstance, but is
presented only to demonstrate the "unique loss to society" caused by
the murder. 53 Pennsylvania's more limited instruction merely ap-
prizes the jurors that VIE is another method of informing them about
the nature and circumstances of the crime. 15 4 Although Tennessee
courts hold that such an instruction is the better practice, it is not
mandated. 155  Florida has also approved the use of limiting
instructions.' 16
148 See Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 752 (Ga. 1994); State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2dt
966, 972 (La. 1992); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (NJ. 1996); Cargle, 909 P.2d at
828; Vesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 891.
149 See, e.g., Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839, 841-42 (Ga. 1997); State v. Gideon, 894
P.2d 850, 864 (Kan. 1995); Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 180.
15o State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 175 (NJ. 2001) (citing Muhammad, 678 A.2d at
180).
151 See, e.g., State v. Hightower, 680 A.2d 649 (N.J. 1996); Cargle, 909 P.2d at 828-29.
152 See Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 175.
153 See Cargle, 909 P.2d at 828.
154 See Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 159 (Pa. 2001).
155 See State v. Bigbee. 885 S.W.2d 797, 812-13 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that trial court
was not required to instruct jury not to consider either the deterrent effect of the death
penalty or the cost of maintaining a prisoner for life even though neither of these factors
should enter a capital jury's sentencing determination).
156 See Farina v. State, 801 So. 21 44, 53 (Fla. 2001).
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TABLE 2157
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN STATES ALLOWING ADMISSION OF
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
Limits on Who
May Testify
Notice to and/or Punishment
Defense In Camera Number of Limits on Use Recommendation
State Required Hearing Witnesses of Evidence from Witness(es)
Alabama No No No No No-Jury
Yes-Judge
Arizona Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Yes
Arkansas Yes No No No No
California Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Colorado Yes No Unclear No No
Delaware Unclear No No Unclear Unclear
Florida Yes Unclear Unclear Yes No
Georgia Yes Yes Yes Unclear Unclear
Idaho Yes No No Unclear No
Illinois Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear
Kansas Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Kentucky Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Louisiana Yes Unclear No Unclear No
Maryland Yes Unclear Yes Unclear No
Missouri No Unclear No Unclear No
Nebraska No Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Nevada Yes Unclear No Unclear No
New Jersey Yes Yes Yes Yes No
New Mexico Unclear Unclear No Unclear No
N. Carolina No No No No No
Ohio Unclear Unclear Yes Yes No
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oregon Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Pennsylvania Yes Unclear Unclear Yes No
S. Carolina No Unclear No Unclear No
S. Dakota Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Tennessee Yes Yes Unclear Yes Unclear
Texas Yes Unclear No Yes Unclear
Utah Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Virginia No No No Yes No-Jury
I _Yes-Judge
Washington Yes Unclear Yes Unclear No
based on the author's
276
157 Table 2 and the preceding discussion in Part 1V.A.2 are
research.
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B. Federal Court
VIE is admissible in federal capital cases as a non-statutory aggra-
vating factor if the jury unanimously finds that the prosecution has
established at least one statutory aggravating factor. 15 8 The federal
death penalty statute permits the government to present evidence
regarding
the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family, and
may include oral testimony, a victim impact statement that identifies
the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and
loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family and any other
relevant information. 15 9
A majority of the federal courts of appeals confronted with VIE
have sanctioned various forms of VIE, including letters, videotapes,
and poems. 160 Federal courts have also permitted VIE from persons
other than family members. In United States v. Battle, which involved
the murder of a federal prison guard, the Eleventh Circuit allowed
VIE regarding the effect of the murder on other correctional officers'
ability to perform their job. 161 Furthermore, in possibly the quintes-
sential VIE case-United States v. McVeigh-the VIE lasted two days and
included evidence regarding survivors' last contacts with murdered
family members, attempts to determine whether their family members
were still alive, and the identification of family members' body
parts.1 62 In another case, a court admitted testimony from officers
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 3(d)-(e) (2000).
159 Id. § 3593(a) (2000).
160 See, e.g., United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (al-
lowing VIE such as photographs and tearful testimony so long as it does not render the
entire proceeding fundamentally unfair). The Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have allowed letters and videotapes. See id. at 1274 (allowing childrens' letters to dead
mother); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 531-33 (6th Cir. 2000) (allowing videotape of a
television interview with the victim and his family filmed the day before the murder); Gret-
zler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that letter from the victim's
father stating his opinion that the defendant should receive the death penalty is permissi-
ble as a "reflection of the anguish [the victim's] death caused to her family"); Davis v.
Singletary, 853 F. Supp. 1492 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (allowing eight letters from eight family
members and one close friend of the murder victim). Although United States v. McVeigh
may not be fairly representative of current federal practice due to the number of victims
involved in the case (168), the judge allowed thirty-eight victim impact witnesses to testify.
See 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998). The evidence permitted was also quite expansive in
scope. See id. at 1219-21. For example, the court allowed victim testimony regarding
"[l]ast [c]ontacts," "[e]fforts to [d]iscover the [flate of [v]ictims," "[i]mpact on [1]earning
of [d]eath," "[v]ictim [h]istories," and "[p]ure [l]ove and [i]nnocence of [c]hildren." Id.;
cf supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (providing examples of the wide variety of
VIE state courts have permitted).
161 See 173 F.3d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1999).
162 See McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1203, 1219-21.
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about rescue efforts, including one macabre account of watching a
victim die and mistaking her "gurgling blood" for "running water."'"!
The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1999 (FDPA) requires the pros-
ecution to provide the defendant with notice of its intent to use VIE
unless the prosecution introduces the VIE to directly rebut mitigating
evidence introduced by the defendant.1 64 In practice, however, courts
have utilized a wide variety of procedural protections. Some district
courts have required very specific notice. In United States v. Cooper, the
court found that "the government's notice of intent contain[ed] no
specific information concerning the evidence it [sought] to intro-
duce" 5 and ordered the government to amend its notice "to include
more specific information concerning the extent and scope of the in-
juries and loss suffered by each victim, his or her family members, and
other relevant individuals, and as to each victim's 'personal character-
istics' that the government intends to prove."'1' 6 In United States v.
Glover, the district court used a scheme similar to that outlined by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Muhammad and required the
prosecution to provide the defense with written statements describing
the testimony of each victim impact witness, the admissibility of which
the court would rule on in advance.16 7 Furthermore, the court agreed
both to warn the witnesses that they could not testify if they could not
control their emotions and to weigh the evidence offered for its pro-
bative value and relevance.'I' The court also excluded testimony as to
the appropriate punishment for the defendant. '-"
VIE is also currently admissible in military proceedings. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and the Military
Service Court of Criminal Appeals have embraced Payne. 71 ,
CONCLUSION-PAYNE MANAGEMENT
Payne is not going away. VIE is politically popular, and it is diffi-
cult to imagine any state or federal court significantly restricting its
admissibility. Furthermore, VIE is largely unregulated. Appellate
161. See Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim
hnpoct Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 143, 154-55 (1999).
164 See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)-(b); see aLlo United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 778-81
(8th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 122 S. Ct. 2653 (2002) (mern.) (holding that FDPA
allows VIE and that the notice and unanimity requirements of the FDPA are adequate
procedural safeguards).
1"5 91 F. Stipp. 2d 90, 111 (D.D.C. 2000).
166 Id.
167 See 43 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1235-36 (D. Kan. 1999).
1(8 See id. at 1236.
1 (;9 See id. at 1235-36.
170 See United States v. Gray, 51 M:]. 1, 60 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States %'. Baer, No.
97-02044, 1999 CCA LEXIS 180, at *9 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.ItIne 30, 1999); United States v.
Taylor, 41 M.J. 701, 705 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).
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court reversals for admitting VIE or argument are as rare as the pro-
verbial hen's teeth. Only a few states-Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana,
and New Jersey-have reversed death sentences due to the admission
of improper VIE. 171 No federal appellate court has found error in the
government's presentation of VIE. As Wayne Logan has noted, some
of this may be due to the lack of consensus as to VIE's basic pur-
pose. 172 Regardless of the reasons, more judicial oversight is neces-
sary on both substantive and procedural issues. Payne suggested that
VIE should offer only a "brief glimpse" of the victim. However, most
jurisdictions permit extensive evidence regarding the victim's charac-
teristics and the impact of the crime on immediate family members.
This type of detailed VIE-often including photographs, videotapes,
and other memorabilia-can only invite the type of "comparative
worth considerations" dismissed by the Payne majority. What else
could a capital sentencing jury think when presented with detailed
evidence about both the defendant and the victim other than that its
role is to decide whether the capital defendant-the person the jury
has found guilty of murder-should be permitted to live when the
innocent victim and his or her family have suffered so much? As Viv-
ian Berger has noted, if VIE is not intended to invite "comparative
worth considerations," then "why do prosecutors never dwell on the
dead person's vices?"' 7 3
Payne also does not address cases in which victims' family mem-
bers do not support the prosecution's efforts to obtain a death sen-
tence. There have been cases in which the prosecution insisted on
seeking the death penalty at trial despite the victims' survivors'
wishes. 174 What then? Do the family members testify if called by the
prosecution? There is no reason to believe that those who do not
favor the death penalty do not suffer the same degree of pain and loss
as a result of the death of their mother, father, or child as do surviving
family members who believe the defendant should be executed for his
171 See Wimberly v. State, 759 So. 2d 568, 574 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (reversing on
other grounds but noting "[i]f we were not already reversing this case for a new trial, we
would set aside the sentence and remand this case to the trial court for a new sentencing
phase before the jury and a new sentencing hearing before the trial court based on ...
admission of improper [VIE]"); Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Ky.
1991) (ordering new sentencing trial due to improper exploitation of the grief of the vic-
tim's family); State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 973 (La. 1992) (remanding the case because
the defendant did not receive a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of the VIE and
more particularized notice of what VIE the State intended to introduce at trial); State v.
Hightower, 680 A.2d 649, 662 (N.J. 1996) (holding that defendant should have been
granted a mistrial because of the prejudicial effect of introducing VIE).
172 See Logan, supra note 163, at 169.
173 Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffefing-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Cri-
tique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21, 46 (1992).
174 See Adrienne N. Barnes, Reverse Impact Testimony: A New and Imnproved Victim ipact
Statement, 14 CAi. DEF. J. 245, 255 (2002).
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crime. And these anti-death penalty individuals may well believe it
would be an act of disloyalty to their dead loved one to refuse to tes-
tify. However, by testifying, they become part of the prosecution's ef-
forts to kill.
Furthermore, in many cases, expansive VIE will inevitably make
way for racial discrimination to operate in the capital sentencing jury's
life or death decision. Virtually every statistical study, including one
commissioned by the federal government, indicates that although the
death penalty is rarely sought in black-victim cases, it is sought (and
obtained) in a disproportionate share of cases involving black defend-
ants and white victims. 175 Capitaljury selection, or "'death qualifica-
tion,"' often results in predominantly or all-white juries. 176 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, there is an inherently subjective ele-
ment in capital sentencing which can allow for jurors' conscious and
unconscious racial biases to play a role in their capital sentencing de-
cisions. 177 Thus, VIE carries the inherent danger that white, middle-
class jurors will most empathize with white middle-class victims and
will thus be more likely to impose the death sentence in cases in which
the victim is similar to them.
Finally, little consensus exists as to whether VIE should be limited
to the testimony of family members and the impact of the offense on
the victim's family or whether it should be permitted to reach into
broader issues of the impact of the crime on other specific communi-
ties or the community at large. There is little or no basis in Payne, for
example, for sanctioning evidence regarding the impact of the crime
on the law enforcement community. 178 And, aside from the wisdom
of doing so, it is difficult to find any basis in Payne for excluding evi-
dence regarding the victim's bad character.
175 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT
MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 159-211
(1989); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DFA-rHI PENAIIY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATTERN OW RACIAL DISPARITIES 5-6 (1990); John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin
T. Wells, Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition (Sept. 18, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). But see WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MVIH OF A
RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 17-18 (1987) (noting "that white killers were actually
more likely than black killers ... to receive the death penalty ... [that] whites who had
killed whites were more likely than blacks who had killed whites ... to be on death row,"
and "that whites who killed blacks were more likely to reach death row than blacks who
killed whites").
176 SeeJEFFRiwYABRAMSON, WE, THIEJURY 209 (1994); see also Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou
Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (1997) (arguing that jurors consider factors such as race and
class).
177 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 38 n.12 (1986).
178 But see supra note 126 and accompanying text (citing a state court case that permit-
ted VIE to show the impact of a law enforcement officer's death on the law enforcement
community).
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Procedurally, the current status quo is unsatisfactory in a number
of areas. It is hardly revolutionary to suggest that the prosecution
should notify a capital defendant if it intends to offer VIE. If due
process means anything, it encompasses the right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 179 Yet notice is not the majority rule.180 Ad-
ditionally, a pre-admissibility hearing outside the presence of the jury
should be mandatory not only to minimize the emotional nature of
the evidence, but also to provide the defendant with the opportunity
to lodge legitimate objections. For example, VIE often entails inad-
missible hearsay. A victim's mother may, for example, testify about
calls from friends, relatives, or others expressing their grief, or she
may make a comment about how "everyone loved my son." Practically
speaking, however, counsel will often feel unable to object to this type
of evidence, in the presence of the jury. Similarly, pre-admissibility
hearings will allow objections to the number of witnesses, as well as
other types of potentially inflammatory evidence, including opinion
testimony. Another solution-if Payne is to remain the law-is to re-
quire written submission of VIE. Not only would this permit defense
counsel to lodge appropriate objections, but it would also reduce
some of the emotional content of the evidence, thereby reducing the
likelihood of a comparative worth comparison. At present, New
Jersey, and to a lesser extent Georgia and Kansas, are the only states
that provide anything resembling adequate procedural safeguards. 181
This Article attempts to set the table for the remaining contribu-
tors to this Symposium by providing a "quick glimpse" of VIE in the
state and federal courts. As a professor who has studied the Supreme
Court's cases and their lower court progeny, and as a lawyer who has
litigated capital cases at trial, in state post-conviction proceedings, and
in federal habeas corpus proceedings, both before and after VIE was
deemed admissible, I think it is accurate to say that Payne represents a
marked "sea change" in capital jurisprudence and capital litigation.
The extent of this change will be explored in detail in this Symposium
and in the years to come.
179 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
180 See supra Table 2.
181 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
